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Conscience Protection and Discrimination in the Republican
Party Platform and Mississippi's H.B. 1523
Linda C. McClain
Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law
June 26 marks the first anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Supreme Court decided that the
Constitution requires the recognition of same-sex marriage. The decision's implications remain as uncertain and
controversial today as they were one year ago.
By: Linda McClain
Last May, before the Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in Obergefell v.
Hodges,Cornerstone sponsored a symposium on “Responding to Indiana RFRA and Beyond,” which
focused on Governor Mike Pence’s swift “fix” of Indiana’s RFRA, after protests and threats of
boycotts, to clarify that it would “not create a license to discriminate.” Particularly controversial were
provisions protecting the conscience of persons operating for-profit businesses. In that symposium,
I observed that public discourse frequently referred back to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because
“many people relate the current battle over protecting conscience in the context of public
accommodations to earlier opposition to ending racial segregation in public accommodations.” That
historical reference point remains salient post-Obergefell, as calls for protecting religious liberty and
conscience increasingly employ the language of protection against “discrimination,” as is illustrated
in the recently-enjoined Mississippi law, H.B. 1523.
Governor Pence is now the vice presidential pick of Republican presidential nominee Donald
Trump. Invoking Justice Scalia’s Obergefell dissent, the 2016 Republican
platform condemns Obergefell as a “lawless ruling” in which “five unelected judges robbed 320
million Americans of their legitimate constitutional authority to define marriage as the union of one
man and one woman.” The platform calls for expansive protection of “religious liberty” and “rights
of conscience,” including forms of protection that proved too controversial last year in Indiana but
have been enacted in Mississippi and elsewhere. The platform declares: “Ongoing attempts to
compel individuals,businesses, and institutions of faith to transgress their beliefs are part of a
misguided effort to undermine religion and drive it from the public square" (emphasis mine).
Given the platform’s call for expansive state and federal laws protecting conscience, it is useful to
consider a recent federal district court opinion striking down Mississippi’s “Protecting Freedom of
Conscience from Discrimination Act,” or H.B. 1523. The opinion reveals the continuing role of
analogies to past civil rights battles. It also stresses the important distinction between civil and
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religious marriage and the limits to moral disapproval as a permissible justification for laws
restricting marriage and other civil rights.
Like H.B. 1523, the Republican platform uses the rhetoric of “government discrimination”: States
and the federal government should protect “individuals and businesses” as well as religious
institutions from “government discrimination for acting on the belief that marriage is the union of
one man and one woman.” Supporters of LGBT rights speak in terms of protection against
discrimination as they seek to exercise civil and constitutional rights; opponents of Obergefell invoke
the language of discrimination to assert that their civil and constitutional rights are at risk.
In Mississippi, H.B. 1523 protects a wide range of public officials and employees, religious persons
and organizations, and for-profit corporations from governmental “discrimination” if they act or
refuse to act in many spheres of society on the basis of three “sincerely held religious beliefs or
moral convictions”: that (1) marriage “is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one
woman”; (2) “sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage”; and (3) being “male” or
“female” is immutably fixed at birth by one’s biological sex. The law would have the effect of
nullifying local ordinances that protected LGBT persons from discrimination—Romer v.
Evans redux.
On June 30, 2016, in Barber v. Bryant, federal district court judge Carlton W. Reeves preliminarily
enjoined H.B. 1523, holding that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By enacting H.B. 1523, he concluded,
Mississippi gave “special rights to citizens who hold one of three ‘sincerely held religious beliefs or
moral convictions’ reflecting disapproval of lesbian, gay, transgender, and unmarried persons,” thus
putting its “thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over others.”
Reeves describes H.B. 1523 as a “direct response” to Obergefell. The rejection of any distinction
between civil and religious marriage shaped this response: Lawmakers asserted that these forms of
marriage should be congruent, not in conflict. Thus, the Speaker of the House stated
that Obergefell was “in direct conflict with God’s design for marriage as set forth in the Bible,” and
posed a “very clear” threat to religious liberty.
Analogies to past civil rights struggles punctuate Judge Reeves’ opinion, including calls for resistance
to Brown v. Board of Education to combat overreach by the federal government. Reeves points out
parallels in the religiously-infused language used to oppose Brown and Obergefell. H.B. 1523 frames the
issue as protecting religious conscience against discrimination, but Judge Reeves focuses on the
discrimination the law licenses in the name of protecting religious beliefs. Observing that “[u]sing
God as a justification for discrimination is nothing new,” he quotes Governor Ross Robert Barnett’s
proclamation that “the Good Lord was the original segregationist.”
Another intriguing feature of Judge Reeves’ opinion is his conclusion that H.B. 1523 takes
sides among various branches of Christianity, rendering some believers “second-class Christians.” It
protects the conscience only of those believers who morally disapprove of extending civil marriage to
same-sex couples. In endorsing and elevating certain religious beliefs, H.B. 1523 “conveys the State’s
disapproval and diminution” of other “deeply held religious beliefs,” sending a message of unequal
protection. Judge Reeves observes that, by contrast, Mississippi’s RFRA affords protection on a
more even basis.
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It is also worth highlighting Judge Reeves’ question about why H.B. 1523 singles out same-sex
marriages in its provisions allowing public officials to recuse themselves from issuing marriages
licenses or solemnizing marriages. This narrow basis for recusal, he observes, offers no similar
“protection” for “some Jewish and Muslim citizens” who are employed as public officials but “may
sincerely believe that their faith prevents them from participating in recognizing or aiding an
interfaith marriage.” He asks: “Why should a clerk with such a religious belief not be allowed to
recuse from issuing a marriage license to an interfaith couple, while her coworkers [who object to
same-sex marriages] have the full protection of H.B. 1523?” This question seems apt given the
Republican Party platform’s strong support for “the freedom of Americans to act in accordance
with their religious beliefs... in their daily lives.”
Just how far should that freedom extend? What limits do the rights of others place upon it? The
platform implicitly answers those questions in one way; Judge Reeves offers an alternative, and in
my view, better resolution.

Linda C. McClain is Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law at Boston University School of
Law.
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